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2
History, the Courts and Treaty
Policy: Lessons from Marshall
and Nisga’a
J.R. (Jim) Miller

During the late 1990s, Canadian history found itself enjoying unaccustomed
prominence in discussions of treaties between the Crown and First Nations.
In a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on Mi’kmaq treaty rights,
history and historians were front and centre, while in the aftermath of the
conclusion of treaty negotiations between the Crown and Nisga’a of northern
British Columbia, historical evidence was important to defenders of the
treaty—the myths of history to the treaty’s opponents. The Marshall and
Nisga’a cases are arguably two of the most important First Nations policy
matters of the past dozen years. Along with other treaty cases such as
Sparrow and Delgamuukw, and the other recent major treaty arrangement,
Nunavut, they have profoundly influenced the course of Canadian law and
history. Moreover, both these cases caused an enormous public uproar in the
Maritimes and British Columbia respectively. The Marshall decision set off
a chain of events that pitted a number of Mi’kmaq communities against the
federal authorities in open defiance of Ottawa’s regulation; the Nisga’a
Treaty provoked an incendiary public debate, a politically inspired court
challenge, and a divisive plebiscite on treaty making in 2002. These two
instances of treaty policy from opposite ends of the country, to a great extent,
revolved around competing visions and interpretations of the Canadian past.
The role of history and historians in these important episodes was important
at the time, and can be instructive for the future.
The Marshall case, or R. v. Marshall to give it its official title, was
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on 17 September 1999, and given
a clarifying second ruling on 17 November 1999.1 It involved an appeal, on
behalf of Donald Marshall, Jr., of a conviction for violating federal fishery
regulations against fishing in the closed season, fishing without a license, and
selling the eels that he had caught without a license. That the case focused
on Donald Marshall added poignancy to what was in and of itself a
significant treaty rights case, for Marshall was the Mi’kmaq man who had
been wrongly convicted of murder in 1971, and who had served eleven years
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for an act someone else committed before he was released. The subsequent
inquiry into the administration of justice in Nova Scotia had exposed a
virulent strain of racism, an exposé whose results would be confirmed in
other parts of the country in later, similar investigations of Aboriginal
peoples and the justice system. Marshall and his lawyers contended that the
federal fishery regulations did not apply to him because, as a Mi’kmaq, he
enjoyed certain treaty-based rights to fish. Convicted, Marshall appealed
unsuccessfully to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. That appeal turned down,
he and his lawyers obtained leave to appeal the convictions on the basis of
treaty rights to the Supreme Court of Canada.2
The Supreme Court’s ruling in September 1999 relied heavily on
eighteenth-century history. The justices listed no fewer than twelve historical
works among their authorities. Moreover, the majority decision, written by
Mr. Justice Ian Binnie, relied heavily on the majority’s reading of
developments in the eighteenth century. In fact, Binnie, who was experienced
in Aboriginal law cases and the historical issues that often figured in them,3
was conscious of, and sensitive to, historians’ opinions. He noted in the
section of his decision on “Expert Evidence” that “the courts have attracted
a certain amount of criticism from professional historians for what these
historians see as an occasional tendency on the part of judges to assemble a
‘cut and paste’ version of history.”4 Justice Binnie, who obviously considered
himself something of a historian, allowed that “the tone of some of this
criticism strikes the non-professional historian as intemperate . . .”5
Briefly, the majority decision found that a treaty of 1760–61, between
the Mi’kmaq and Britain, had created a treaty right that authorized the
Mi’kmaq to fish “for necessaries” sufficient to furnish them a moderate
livelihood. That historical basis, Binnie concluded, provided a treaty right
that was protected by Section 35 of the 1982 Constitution, the clause that
“recognized and affirmed” the Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal
peoples. As such, the majority ruled, federal fishery regulations governing
a closed season and requiring licenses to fish and sell the catch abridged
the treaty right and were, accordingly, null and void. For their part, the
minority of the court, through the written opinion of future Chief Justice
Beverley McLachlin, rehearsed much of the same historical evidence and
came to the conclusion that “there is no existing right to trade in the Treaties
of 1760–61 that exempts the appellant from the federal fisheries
regulations.”6
Behind the duelling historical Supreme Court justices stood a trio of
adversarial professional historians. The Crown’s case rested on interpretation
of eighteenth-century events involving the Mi’kmaq and British authorities
provided by Professor Stephen E. Patterson of the University of New
Brunswick, while Marshall’s lawyers turned to St. Mary’s University
historian John Reid and York historian William Wicken. Patterson was a
This is an excerpt from "Volume 1: Setting the Agenda for Change" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013
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specialist in American colonial history, who, at the request of the office of the
Nova Scotia attorney general in 1988, had turned his attention to the
Mi’kmaq treaties. Professor Reid was a senior and well-known specialist in
Maritime colonial history involving Native-newcomer relations who had also
done research on treaties between the Abenaki and Britain at the request of
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP). Professor Wicken,
though a more junior academic historian than Patterson and Reid, had the
advantage when the case was first heard of being on the eve of completing
his doctoral dissertation on the evolution of the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia.
According to Wicken’s account, Patterson testified for a total of eleven days,
Reid for seven days, and he for a daunting fourteen and one-half days of the
forty-day trial.7
What set the historian for the Crown at odds with his colleagues who
testified on behalf of Donald Marshall was their interpretation of key
eighteenth-century treaties between the Mi’kmaq and Britain. What was at
issue, in fact, was a series of such treaties covering the period from 1725 to
the early 1760s. The initial 1725–26 treaty, in large part repeated in another
treaty of 1752, contained explicit clauses guaranteeing continuing rights to
hunt and fish:
Saving unto the Penobscot, Naridgewalk and other Tribes within
His Majesty’s province aforesaid and their natural Descendants
respectively all their lands, liberties and properties not by them
convey’d or sold to or possessed by any of the English Subjects as
aforesaid. As also the privilege of fishing, hunting, and fowling as
formerly. [Treaty of Boston, 1725]
It is agreed that the said Tribe of Indians shall not be hindered from,
but have free liberty of Hunting and Fishing as usual and that if they
shall think a Truckhouse needful at the River Chibenaccadie
[Shubenacadie] or any other place of their resort they shall have the
same built and proper Merchandize, lodged therein, to be
Exchanged for what the Indians shall have to dispose of. [Treaty of
Halifax, 1752]8
These treaties were inspired on the British side by a desire to regularize
relations with the Mi’kmaq, who were staunch allies of the rival French,
because of ongoing tensions between France and Great Britain in the
Maritime theatre, and elsewhere, during the first half of the eighteenth
century.
The treaty of 1760, made in Halifax by Mi’kmaq Chief Michael
Augustine and extended to other parts of the Maritime region in 1760–61, reestablished relations between Britain and the Mi’kmaq after the conclusion
of the Maritime phase of the Seven Years’ War, a struggle in which the British
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had finally bested the French. Its wording on hunting-gathering and trade was
significantly different from that of the earlier pacts:
And I do further engage that we will not traffic, barter or exchange
any commodities in any manner but with such persons or the
managers of such truck houses as shall be appointed or established
by His Majesty’s Governor at Fort Cumberland or elsewhere in
Nova Scotia or Acadia.9
Stephen Patterson, who had recorded his interpretation in important
academic journal articles, took the view that the 1760–61 treaties were
qualitatively different from the earlier treaties, which were predominantly
peace and friendship treaties.10 In his view, the treaties that restored relations
after the Seven Years’ War represented British imposition of its rule
following victory. By them, he argued, the Mi’kmaq, who had for decades
bedevilled British control of the region by their adherence to the French
alliance, finally bowed to the new reality and agreed to recognize British
control over them. Moreover, their economic dependence on access to British
trade goods, combined with the French defeat, led to the inclusion of a clause
in the 1760–61 treaty that referred to their obligation to bring their trade
goods to British “truck houses,” or subsidized government trading centres.
In Patterson’s interpretation, the key Mi’kmaq-British treaty was concluded
in an environment of Britain’s military victory and connoted Mi’kmaq
dependence and submission.
Reid and Wicken, of course, took a contrary view. Their expert
testimony emphasized a longer sweep of Maritime treaty making than did
Patterson’s, which focused more on the 1760–61 agreements. These
witnesses for the appellant treated the period from the 1720s to the 1760s as
a single unit, and they saw the 1725 and 1752 agreements as models for the
later treaties. They were not inclined, as Patterson was, to see a dramatic
difference in the changed circumstances in the Maritimes at the end of the
Seven Years’ War, and they did not think that the 1760–61 treaties, despite
their altered wording about gathering and trading rights, connoted Mi’kmaq
submission and dependence. Markedly more than Patterson, Reid and
Wicken believed that the British felt a necessity to improve relations with the
Mi’kmaq after the war, a perception that made the British eager to conciliate
the Mi’kmaq in order to reach an agreement. As Wicken has explained,
For our part, Reid and I argued that the 1761 treaty was the result
of a consensual agreement made between the Mi’kmaq and British.
We stressed that British power was less omnipotent and more
tenuous than Patterson suggested. We argued that the British wanted
a treaty to neutralize the Mi’kmaq during the war with France so
that British settlement of the region could proceed peacefully. For
these two reasons, we argued that the treaty’s language was less
reflective of British power than Patterson supposed.11
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Wicken suggested that the British and Mi’kmaq had different perceptions
and understanding of what they had agreed to in 1760–61: while British
officials might have believed that they had secured Mi’kmaq submission by
these pacts, Mi’kmaq had a different understanding that did not contain
obligations to obey and submit. Wicken pointed to Mi’kmaq oral history
evidence that supported what he said of Mi’kmaq understandings of the
agreements.
Clearly, the duelling historical experts left the justices, including the
amateur historian who eventually wrote the majority judgement, with an
interpretive challenge every bit as daunting as anything professional
historians had to confront. Writing for the majority, Justice Ian Binnie found
that the restricted language of the 1760–61 treaties contained a general right
to fish and trade to achieve a moderate livelihood. His argument rested
principally on the concept of “the honour of the Crown” and on his reading
of Dr. Stephen Patterson’s expert testimony. The “honour of the Crown,” a
guide to interpreting Crown-Aboriginal dealings that was well established in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, required that the Court conclude that the right
conferred on the Mi’kmaq by treaty not be a restricted, negative requirement
to bring trade goods to government-established trade houses, but a general
right to trade for necessaries. Moreover, Binnie concluded that a treaty right
to trade carried with it a “reasonably incidental” right to gather those things
that were to be traded. His reading of Patterson’s narration and analysis of
the treaty negotiations, and the general context of British-Mi’kmaq relations
about 1760, led him to conclude that the British desire to conciliate the
Mi’kmaq in order to ensure enduring peace and facilitate British
development of Nova Scotia meant that the treaty terms were significant
concessions to the Mi’kmaq. Interestingly, Mr. Justice Binnie rested much of
his historical analysis on the testimony of Professor Patterson, who had been
a witness for the other side. The author of the majority opinion had almost
nothing to say about the expert testimony of the historians who appeared on
behalf of the appellant.
In her ruling for the two-judge minority, Justice Beverley McLachlin
politely, but firmly, disagreed with nearly every point of the majority ruling.
As the trial judge had initially, she found that the 1760–61 treaty conferred
merely what the plain words of the government text suggested: the Mi’kmaq
were required to bring their trade goods to government truckhouses. This,
she said, conferred a “right to bring,” but not a general treaty right to trade.
In her opinion Justice McLachlin provided her own analysis of the historical
context in which the treaties had been made, almost completely ignoring the
conflicting testimony of the professional historians who had appeared at the
original trial. Firmly she concluded: “There is no existing right to trade in the
Treaties of 1760–61 that exempts the appellant from the federal fisheries
regulation. It follows that I would dismiss the appeal.”12
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What is striking about the historical duel at the Supreme Court is that
obvious issues of historical context were not effectively explored in the
decisions. There was, as noted earlier, a marked difference of language in the
1752 and 1760–61 treaties in relation to trade. The early agreement was
expansive and explicit: it said clearly that the Mi’kmaq signatories had a
“free liberty of Hunting and Fishing as usual,” while the several treaties of
1760–61 contained a Mi’kmaq commitment that “we will not traffic, barter
or exchange any commodities in any manner but with such persons or the
managers of such truck houses as shall be appointed or established . . .” The
difference in language seemed to support the Crown expert’s contention that
the later treaties, on which the Marshall appeal rested, was a more submissive
document concluded at a time when the French, the allies of the Mi’kmaq,
had been defeated and the Mi’kmaq consequently were left vulnerable and
dependent on the British. Such had been the clear message of Dr. Patterson’s
scholarly analysis of the period.13
The Marshall decision, as is well known, had an interesting aftermath.
Following the September 1999 decision, the Mi’kmaq assumed that they had
a general right to fish and harvest other resources limited only by their own
conservation codes. Their continuing to fish out of season provoked violent
reactions from non-Native fishers and for a time threatened the peace of
various regions of the Maritimes, in particular the Miramichi area. Much less
noticed was the indignant reaction of Stephen Patterson to the way in which
Justice Binnie had used his expert testimony to buttress the majority
Supreme Court decision. “Binnie,” he told the National Post, “ignored all
aspects of my testimony that established the context within which my
remarks were given and comes to a conclusion that when I said they had
rights, it was a section 35 (1) privileged right, quite apart from the rights that
any other subject would have. I think that seriously distorts whatever can be
drawn from the treaties.” Binnie, he charged, had engaged in “a selective use
of evidence.”14 When the Supreme Court took the unusual step of issuing a
supplementary judgement on Marshall in November 1999, it restricted itself
to reiterating more emphatically points it had made in its September ruling
and did not address the charge of historical misinterpretation. No doubt
Justice Binnie ruefully concluded that after Marshall the Supreme Court had
“attracted a certain amount of criticism from professional historians for what
these historians see as an occasional tendency on the part of judges to
assemble a ‘cut and paste’ version of history.”15
“At 8:27 a.m., our canoe arrived,” an excited Joseph Gosnell told
assembled reporters. “The journey our ancestors began more than a century
ago ended.”16 Gosnell, a major negotiator of the draft treaty between his
people, the Nisga’a, and the Crown, was referring to the lengthy history that
lay behind the agreement. In 1887, when non-Natives were beginning to
invade their lands in the Nass River valley of northern B.C., a delegation of
Nisga’a paddled all the way to distant Victoria to bring their complaint to the
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government and ask that a treaty be negotiated with them. When they
encountered the government, they were forced to meet with its leader in his
own residence, because Premier William Smithe wanted to avoid a large
gathering in a more public setting. Apparently, Premier Smithe believed that
the Nisga’a were acting under the malign influence of some missionaries,
and, if he could separate the Natives from their clerical advisors, he could
deal with them and their arguments more swiftly and effectively. In any
event, he made it clear to the delegation that he and his government would
not entertain their case, for the simple reason that they did not, and could not,
have a valid claim to the territory they had inhabited since a time far earlier
than the arrival of Europeans. “When the whites first came among you,” the
premier told them, “you were little better than wild beasts of the field.” And,
of course, wild beasts could have no legitimate claim to lands that Christian
British-Canadians were prepared to recognize.17
In spite of the rebuff, the Nisga’a did not give up. They continued to
make their case for recognition of their right to the lands they inhabited to a
succession of commissions that British Columbia and Canada established
over the next few decades. They formed the Nisga’a Land Committee in 1907
and, in 1913, petitioned London for recognition of their ownership of their
territory. They were also active in the Allied Tribes of British Columbia,
which, in the second decade of the twentieth century, worked to get the
results of one of those federal-provincial commissions on the B.C. Aboriginal
lands issue set aside and replaced with a more equitable settlement of their
claims. They were also part of a united First Nations movement from British
Columbia that appeared, unsuccessfully, before a joint parliamentary
committee in 1926. For their pains, they and their associates the next year
saw the Parliament of Canada pass an amendment to the Indian Act that made
it a crime to give or solicit any money for pursuit of an Indian claim.
A less determined people might have despaired and given up at that
point, for the Indian Act amendment effectively precluded First Nations from
being able to hire lawyers to assist them in their dealings with government.
Yet they persisted, especially after Parliament repealed the ban on fundraising or giving in 1951, and in 1973 they were the party that brought the
Supreme Court of Canada to make a landmark ruling on Aboriginal title. In
the Calder case in that year, six of the seven justices of the court that heard
the case concluded that such a thing as Aboriginal title existed in Canadian
law. That might not sound like much of an advance now, in the aftermath of
the much more expansive Aboriginal title ruling in the Delgamuukw decision
of 1997. However, in 1973 the Calder verdict was dramatic. For example, it
caused Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau to say to some First Nations
leaders, “Well, I guess you have more rights than we thought you had when
we did the White Paper,”18 and to establish the Office of Native Claims in
1974 to deal with both comprehensive, or Aboriginal title, claims and
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specific claims. The Nisga’a persisted for another quarter-century until they
reached agreement with the Crown in the 1990s.
I recite the lengthy history of the Nisga’a claim for a simple reason:
opponents of the Nisga’a Treaty totally ignored the historic basis of the
agreement and focussed on ahistorical objections. Briefly, the numerous and
voluble critics of the Nisga’a Treaty objected that by it Canada gave too
much territory to the Nisga’a, granted them a “race-based” government with
excessive powers in the territory they retained, and handed over to them a
“race-based” fishery.19 In the forests of paper and oceans of ink—not to
mention the hours of open-line radio shows—that were expended on the
Nisga’a agreement, there was relatively little attention paid to the historical
context of the treaty and the historical justification for its main terms.20 That
inattention to the past is unfortunate, for history has much to offer those who
seek to understand the significance of the Nisga’a Treaty.
Take, for example, the charge of treaty opponents that Canada gave the
Nisga’a too much territory. Perhaps the least important counter-argument is
that the approximately 2,000 square kilometres involved is about 8 percent
of what they had claimed as their traditional territory. This tract is a tiny
portion of British Columbia, or of Canada. In addition, the Nisga’a hold
these lands in fee simple, not as a reserve. In other words they are landholders
like other British Columbians. More important than these arguments of
proportion and status, however, is the historically grounded point that the
Nisga’a Treaty gives the Nisga’a nothing; it merely allows them to retain
8 percent of what they and Canadian law regarded as theirs. To understand
the historical case for this point it is necessary to consider the Nisga’a
assertion of Aboriginal title and the evolution of Canadian law on
Aboriginal title.
The Nisga’a never accepted that their title had been extinguished or
somehow transferred to the Crown. Just a few months after their disheartening encounter with B.C.’s premier in Victoria in 1887, their leaders met
in the Nass Valley with a royal commission that was looking into Native
lands in the province. When the parties met at Nass harbour, the Nisga’a
chiefs were first amused and then astounded to discover that the government
representatives believed that the Indians had no rights to the lands they were
standing on. Charles Russ, a Nisga’a, responded: “We took the Queen’s flag
and laws to honour them. We never thought when we did that she was taking
the land away from us.” He and his colleagues also made it clear that they
were not opposed to sharing their lands with non-Natives, but they wanted
a treaty that would recognize and protect their rights. “We want,” Russ
explained, “the words and hands of the chiefs on both sides, Indian and
Government, to make a promise on paper—a strong promise—that will be
not only for us, but our children and forever.” If the government would do
that, “it will be finished.”21 Of course, that statement of ownership, that offer
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to share, and that demand for a treaty to regulate matters were not responded
to by the government, and the Nisga’a, as noted earlier, fought consistently
and persistently for recognition of their territorial rights. With the Nisga’a
Petition, in the Allied Tribes movement, and later in court actions, they
continued their rejection of the idea that non-Natives had acquired their lands,
and they sought recognition of their continuing ownership and an agreement.
While the Nisga’a fought their century-long campaign, the judicial
system slowly came round to a view of Aboriginal title that in many ways
resembled theirs. The 1888 decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council (JCPC), then the highest court in the British Empire, in the St.
Catharines Milling case found that Aboriginal people had rights of usage on
lands thanks to the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Aboriginal right to the land,
the JCPC said, was “a personal and usufructuary right dependent on the
goodwill of the Sovereign.” In addition, this right was only a “burden” on the
underlying title enjoyed by the Crown. The implication of this finding was
that the Crown, acting through Parliament, could extinguish this right of
usage. It was this view of limited Aboriginal title, of course, that permitted
arbitrary infringements on Aboriginal territorial rights, including in the B.C.
case the refusal of both levels of government for a long time to acknowledge
that First Nations there held Aboriginal title that needed to be addressed. The
next advance in judicial understanding of Aboriginal title came in 1973 in
Calder v. The Attorney General of British Columbia, in which the Supreme
Court of Canada, by now the highest court for Canadians, concluded that
Aboriginal title was not solely dependent on the goodwill of the sovereign
and of the Parliament of which the Crown is a part. Rather, they found in
Calder, Aboriginal occupancy of lands “amounted to a form of title that was
enforceable at common law, whether the government acknowledged this or
not.”22
The latest phase in the evolution of judicial thinking on Aboriginal title
was the 1997 Delgamuukw decision, in which the Supreme Court of Canada
held that Aboriginal title was “a right to the land itself,” rather than just the
right to use and enjoy it. This decision, and other high court rulings of the
1990s such as the Sparrow decision of 1990 on the Aboriginal right to fish,
laid down strict requirements that governments had to meet if they were
intent upon extinguishing an Aboriginal right. Thus, in the 110 years between
the encounter of the Nisga’a with B.C. Premier Smithe in Victoria and the
Delgamuukw decision, judicial understanding of Aboriginal rights to territory
developed to a point that in significant ways resembles what Charles Russ
told the commissioners in Nass Harbour in 1888.
The implications of this history for the argument of the treaty critics that
Canada gave the Nisga’a too much territory, of course, is that the criticism
is completely unfounded. Canada could not give the Nisga’a too much
territory for the simple reason, as the Nisga’a had always and the Supreme
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Court of Canada eventually said, that the land was not Canada’s to give. In
the absence of land-related treaties covering the Nass Valley, the Nisga’a
retained Aboriginal title to the territory until the Nisga’a Treaty, “a promise
on paper—a strong promise,” dealt with it.
The charges that the treaty conferred “race-based” rights, including
rights of self-government and a share of the fishery, are similarly ill-founded
when viewed historically. With these objections, as with the complaint that
the treaty gave too much territory to the Nisga’a, there are important
contextual considerations that should be taken into account, quite apart from
the important point that “race” is a social construct and not material reality.
The fact of the matter is that the power of self-government in the continuing
Nisga’a territory is vested in a community that is not racially “pure”—as
though any group is—after more than a century of contact and interaction
with non-Natives, and that citizenship in the territory will be decided by
Nisga’a law. Moreover, Aboriginal rights are not based on “race,” but rather
on prior occupation. If the Nisga’a were all blonde and blue-eyed—as some
status Indians are—they would still enjoy Aboriginal rights if their ancestors
had occupied their territory prior to the coming of Europeans. The definition
of Nisga’a citizenship remains open for the future, and keeps alive the
possibility that Nisga’a citizenship will be defined in ways that are not
ethnically exclusive.
While it is a mug’s game to predict the future of citizenship, Nisga’a or
any other, there are patterns in the past that provide some clues as to what
might happen when the Nisga’a define the membership of their political
community. While there certainly are instances in the past in which First
Nation leaders have advocated rejection of all things European, just as there
are now First Nation intellectuals who endorse exclusive notions of Indianness, overall First Nations have not behaved historically in ethnically
exclusive ways. It is a striking, though insufficiently recognized, detail of
Native-newcomer history that First Nations have accepted and integrated
non-Natives into their communities and even accorded them positions of
leadership. During seventeenth-century warfare in the eastern woodlands, the
loss of warriors led many First Nations, notably the Iroquois, to incorporate
both settler and Aboriginal captives into their communities. The Mohawk at
Kahnawake in Quebec, for example, incorporated both warriors from other
nations and New England settlers taken in battle into their families to replace
lost comrades. In some cases captives even rose to be leaders of their new
communities. Timothy Rice of the Massachusetts colony became “the eldest
chief and chief speaker” of Kahnawake, while Oliver Spencer became a
leader among the Shawnee.23 Plains peoples also regularly accepted nonNatives as members of their communities, as the history of the fur trade
documents very well. This practice even persisted after the arrival of the
Canadian settlement frontier. In the early 1880s, the Indian Agent at
Muscowequan in Saskatchewan reported “many French half-breeds” in the
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band. 24 The Blood nation in southern Alberta incorporated an AfricanAmerican, Henry Mills, and his children into their ranks, referring to Henry
as the “Black White man.” 25 All in all, the history of First Nations’
community formation since the coming of the Europeans has been inclusive.
In fact, it was only when the legislature of the united Province of Canada
(the colony formed by the union of Lower and Upper Canada in 1840) began
to define “Indian” legislatively in 1850–51, that racial exclusiveness was
introduced to the concept of Indian-ness. After Confederation, the Gradual
Enfranchisement Act of 1869 introduced a blood quantum to the definition
of “Indian,” and the Indian Act between 1876 and 1985 systematically made
the definition even more exclusive. The creation of an Indian Register in 1951
added to the powers of the Indian Affairs department to police its definition.
Canadian history shows that if anyone has been consistently racist in
defining “Indians,” it has been Euro-Canadian society and the Parliament of
Canada. This behaviour by the Euro-Canadian majority stands in marked
contrast to the usual practices of First Nations communities throughout
Canadian history. Given that history, there is every reason to expect that
Nisga’a citizenship and government will, if left to the First Nation itself, not
be race-based.
So far as the argument that other aspects of the Nisga’a Treaty are
objectionable because they are “race-based” and confer privileges such as
fishing rights on a specific group is concerned, this too misses the historical
point. As Hamar Foster has pointed out, it is somewhat hypocritical of
Canadian and British Columbia society—dominated by people of European
ancestry that subjected First Nations to inferior treatment, including denial
of the right to vote until forty years ago—to turn around and whine that some
sacred Canadian principle of equality before the law is being violated
because the Nisga’a are guaranteed a minimum share of the fishery. 26
Moreover, the simple fact is that a variety of groups are singled out for
special treatment in the Canadian Constitution. Until the “fixed link” was
being constructed, Prince Edward Islanders were constitutionally guaranteed
maintenance of steam communication year-round between themselves and
the mainland. The Protestant minority of Quebec, and the Roman Catholic
minority of Ontario, were promised in the 1867 Cconstitution that their
denominational educational rights were placed beyond provincial legislature
control and that the federal government could intervene to remedy any
infringement of those rights that the province might subsequently legislate.
The people of Quebec were constitutionally promised a distinctive legal
system in 1867. The 1982 constitutional package included a
“notwithstanding clause” that permits provinces to pass legislation that
would otherwise be unconstitutional, opening the possibility of citizens in
some province or provinces being subjected to laws from which citizens
elsewhere are protected. Beyond the constitutional realm, there are numerous
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instances of differential treatment, including at law, of certain classes of
Canadians. Both the armed forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
have their own disciplinary codes. The notion of one, undifferentiated
constitutional and legal regime for all Canadians is a fable.
Critics who overheat about what they perceive to be violations of equal
treatment for all groups within Canada need to get in touch with our history.
So far as First Nations and First Nations’ rights are concerned, that history
includes, in particular, section 35 of the 1982 Constitution that states: “the
Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples are hereby recognized
and affirmed.” A subsection says, for the benefit of those who mistakenly
argued that the Nisga’a Treaty was a Constitutional amendment, that this
protection covers all existing and future treaties. The fact of the matter is that
recognition of special group rights is central to Canada’s history, and that the
Canadian Constitution since 1982 has said explicitly that Aboriginal peoples
are, in some important respects, privileged over other collectives. As noted
earlier, such Aboriginal rights are not based on race. They are founded on the
historical reality that Native peoples lived in Canada prior to European
occupancy. Both history and the law of the land provide for differential
treatment of several classes of people. Canadians should just learn to deal
with the fact that Aboriginal peoples enjoy such rights.
Both the Marshall case and the Nisga’a Treaty—important Canadian
landmarks of the 1990s—demonstrate the relevance of Canadian history to
policy making, especially the treaty-making and interpretation process. In
Marshall, the courts wrestled with a large volume of contradictory historical
interpretation in coming to their conclusions—competing conclusions—
about a Mi’kmaq treaty right to fish and trade. This case was by no means
unique in the prominence it gave to history. The 1990 Sioui decision
concerning the treaty right to carry out religious observances, in spite of
limitations flowing from Quebec provincial law and other high court rulings
of the last fifteen years, have also turned on Native-newcomer history. If
Marshall demonstrates anything about history, in addition to its relevance to
a broad range of Aboriginal litigation, it shows the desirability of compulsory
Canadian history courses in secondary schools and post-secondary
institutions. The Nisga’a Treaty, and its aftermath, illustrates another facet of
the relevance of history to treaty policy issues. Had champions of the treaty
been able to disseminate their explanations of the historical context in which
that important agreement emerged, much of the ill temper and disturbance
that characterized public debate in British Columbia might have been
avoided.27
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Of course, this plea for recognizing the relevance of history to this
critical policy area has an obvious weakness: it assumes that courts will be
capable of interpreting history properly and that opinion-makers will be
interested in hearing historical justifications with open minds. Whether or not
this country’s historical experience validates those assumptions is a topic for
another day.
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